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CALIFORNIA NEGOTIATED HEALTH CARE:
IMPLICATIONS FOR MALPRACTICE LIABILITY
This Comment addresses the impact of California's new Medi-
Cal payment system, selective provider contracting, on physician,
hospital and state liability. Selective provider contracting encour-
ages provider cost efficiency by contractually binding providers to
a pre-determined cost allowance, thereby creating cost-conscious-
ness in medical decision-making. Such consideration may affect
the physician's standard of care. Change in the physician's duty to
the beneficiary would also affect hospital liability under respon-
deat superior and corporate negligence principles. Additionally,
selective provider contracting may expose the state to liability for
negligent provider selection and review.
INTRODUCTION
Medicaid1 is a federal-state cooperative medical assistance pro-
gram designed to provide high quality medical care to specific per-
sons.2 The program operates under state direction. Each state is re-
sponsible for formulating and administering a Medicaid plan which
conforms to broad federal regulations.3 Eligible state Medicaid plans
are subsidized by the federal government. California's Medicaid pro-
gram is called Medi-Cal.
4
In recent years, cost has become an important issue for Medicaid
administrators. California, in 1982, adopted a program of direct con-
tracting with selected providers.5 Selective provider contracting is a
new Medi-Cal payment strategy directed at cost containment. This
Comment addresses the potential impact of the new payment
method on the standard of care in medical malpractice actions and
its implications for physician, hospital and state liability.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. Id. See also Silver, Medicaid: Title XIX of the Social Security Act: A Review
and Analysis, Part 1, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 239 (1970). Generally, Medicaid is avail-
able to persons with low incomes. Each state, however, establishes its own Medicaid eligi-
bility requirements.
3. 45 C.F.R. §§ 201-282.48 (1982).
4. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14081-14087.45 (West Supp. 1983).
5. Id.
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CALIFORNIA'S PRIOR PAYMENT METHODS
Selective provider contracting, California's present payment
method, differs significantly from prior Medi-Cal payment schemes.
An overview of past payment methods is essential to an understand-
ing of the significance of the recent changes.
Originally, Medi-Cal payments were made on a fee-for-service ba-
sis.' Federal regulations required Medicaid agencies to pay the rea-
sonable cost of hospital inpatient services.7 California's Health De-
partment determined reasonable cost by post-service audits
conducted at the end of the hospital's fiscal year." Hospitals were
reimbursed at the lesser of the reasonable cost of services or hospital
charges. 9
The fee-for-service method, however, provided little incentive for
hospitals to limit costs.10 The Department of Health Services became
concerned about increasing medical expenditures. In response to this
concern, the Department periodically altered its method of determin-
ing reasonable cost, but payment methods continued to be cost-
based."
In 1972, then-governor Reagan implemented a pre-paid health
plan (PHP) as an alternative to the traditional fee-for-service pay-
ment system.12 The PHP program shifted Medi-Cal cost risks to the
private sector.'3 The state contracted with select providers to furnish
Medi-Cal benefits to beneficiaries who voluntarily choose to enroll in
the program.14 Enrolled beneficiaries used only contracting providers
6. California Dep't of Health Servs., Peer Grouping Hospitals for Medi-Cal Inpa-
tient Reimbursement Purposes 3 (Jan. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Peer Grouping
Hospitals].
7. id.
8. Id. at 8.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 12. The fee-for-service system, under which reasonable cost determines
payment, has been criticized for failing to create cost-saving incentives among providers,
because reasonable cost reimbursement guarantees hospitals reimbursement for virtually
all expenditures. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, RISING
HOSPITAL COSTS CAN BE RESTRAINED BY REGULATING PAYMENTS AND IMPROVING
MANAGEMENT (1980).
11. Id. at 9. In 1975, the Department of Health Services attempted to limit each
hospital's reimbursement to 110% of the previous year's reimbursement. Id. The reim-
bursement limitation was intended to curb Medi-Cal costs. The 110% limitation was suc-
cessfully challenged in California Hosp. Ass'n v. Obledo, 602 F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1979).
The court invalidated the reimbursement limitation because the program had not been
sufficiently evaluated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 602 F.2d at
1361-62.
12. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14200 - 14499 (West 1980).
13. See, e.g., Schneider & Stern, Health Maintenance Organizations and the
Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 90, 129 (1975). The authors analyze
the objectives and consequences of contracting under the PHP program. Contracting and
its shifting of risk of Medi-Cal costs to the private sector are explained in the context of
then-Governor Reagan's policies for Medi-Cal reform.
14. 1982 CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF HEALTH SERVS., ANN. REP. TO THE GOVERNOR
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for virtually all medical care needs.15 Providers were responsible for
costs in excess of contract price, as based on a prospective assess-
ment of yearly cost."' Payments were usually made on a per capita
basis.117
The PHP program was adopted as a cost-control measure. Its cost
saving potential, however, was significantly reduced by the limited
number of enrolled beneficiaries.18 Apparently, the Department was
unable to create sufficient incentive for beneficiaries to enroll. Criti-
cisms concerning the quality of care provided under the program
may have contributed to the low level of beneficiary participation in
the program. 9 At any rate, the program failed to solve the Medi-Cal
cost problem.
In 1982, California attempted to place a cap on provider reim-
bursement under the fee-for-services system. Provider reimburse-
ment was to be limited to no more than 106% of the average reim-
bursement per patient received by the hospital in the previous year.2 0
The California Hospital Association, the United Hospital Associa-
tion, and the Association of Children's Hospitals sued in federal
court to enjoin implementation of the 106% limitation.21 The court
ruled that the 106% limitation failed to satisfy federal requirements
that reimbursement rates be adequate to meet the costs of efficiently
AND THE LEGISLATURE: PREPAID HEALTH PLANS AND PILOT PROGRAMS, DUAL CHOICE 1




18. Id. In 1982, less than six percent of the total Medi-Cal beneficiary population
chose to participate in the PHP program.
19. During its initial-years, the program was beset with criticisms concerning profi-
teering, fraud, and marketing abuses. Schneider & Stern, supra note 13 at 129-30 n.203
(citing L.A. Times, May 23, 1974, pt. 1 at 1, col. 1. In 1975, the program was reviewed
and evaluated to determine its viability. The Department of Health Services made revi-
sions in the implementation and regulation of the program. 1981 CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF
HEALTH SERVS., ANN. REP. TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE: PREPAID
HEALTH PLANS, PILOT PROGRAMS. Still, the PHP program has been criticized for quality
of care abuses. Schneider & Stern, supra note 13, at 134. The authors disclose evidence
that contracting providers underuse the PHP program. Complaints filed with the Na-
tional Health Law Program by beneficiaries indicate incidents where beneficiaries were
unable to receive medical treatment. For example, one incident involved a three-year-old
girl who, after breaking her arm, sat in pain at a participating hospital from 10 a.m.
until 6 p.m. without receiving medical attention. After being sent home to await further
word, the girl, at 9 p.m., was taken to a nonparticipating hospital where she received
immediate medical treatment. Payment was made by the patient's family.
20. Peer Grouping Hospitals, supra note 6, at 14 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 5538 (West 1982)).
21. California Hosp. Ass'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 110 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
and economically operated hospitals.2" Thus, California's scheme for
cost containment by flat percentage increases was invalidated.
Prior State Quality Control Measures
As previously noted, each state is responsible for regulating health
care quality under its Medicaid plan. Under the fee-for-service sys-
tem, California's quality management measures were limited prima-
rily to licensing and certification activities conducted by the Licens-
ing and Certification Division of the State Department of Health
Services. 23 The Division inspects and qualifies all health care provid-
ers, including those not participating in Medi-Cal, as fit to serve the
public.
24
Under the PHP program, the Department of Health Services used
additional quality control measures, including annual medical audits
conducted by the Audit and Investigations Division of the Depart-
ment of Health Services. 25 Audits included facility inspection and
evaluation of health care based on patient medical chart reviews.26
Additionally, the Department monitored enrollee satisfaction by re-
viewing enrollee complaints, determining the number and type of
monthly voluntary disenrollments, and conducting beneficiary satis-
faction surveys.27
Prior state quality control measures did not subject the state to
liability to the Medi-Cal beneficiary for the malpractice of Medi-Cal
providers. A governmental immunity statute precludes state liability
for injury resulting from the inappropriate licensure or certification
of a medical care provider.28 Apparently, PHP program quality con-
trol measures were not sufficiently extensive so as to expose the state
22. Id. In 1981, Congress removed the requirement that hospitals be reimbursed
the reasonable cost of services provided. Instead, the state is required to pay an amount
adequate to meet the costs of efficiently and economically operated hospitals. 31
U.S.C.A. § 7305 (West 1983). See also Peer Grouping Hospitals, supra note 6, at 13.
23. T. CHRISTOFEL, HEALTH AND THE LAW 80 (1982). Licensing laws control en-
try into the medical occupation as well as enforce standards of practice among providers.
Generally, certification is "the process by which a non-government agency or association
grants recognition to an individual who has met certain predetermined qualifications
specified by that agency or association." Id. at 91. In this sense, certification is a term of
art referring to a particular type of provider qualification. In California, however, "certi-
fication" is implemented by a governmental agency. Apparently, the term "certification"
is used in a general sense, rather than as a term of art.
24. Id. at 80, 85. Generally, licensing boards carry out the following functions: (1)
examination of applicants, (2) issuance of licenses, (3) suspension, revocation, and resto-
ration of licensure, (4) enforcement of the licensing statute, and (5) approval of profes-
sional schools. Id. at 85.
25. PHP REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3. In 1982, voluntary beneficiary disenrollment was approximately two
percent on a statewide basis.
28. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.4 (West 1980).
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to liability for injury resulting from negligent quality management.2 9
The new Medi-Cal payment method may, however, expose the state
to liability for injury to beneficiaries.
SELECTIVE PROVIDER CONTRACTING:
CALIFORNIA'S NEW PAYMENT SYSTEM
California's new Medi-Cal legislation, through a system of selec-
tive provider contracting, attempts to contain spiralling Medi-Cal
costs.30 The legislation enables the state to contract with individual
or group providers to furnish Medi-Cal beneficiaries inpatient medi-
cal care.3' With limited exceptions,3 2 beneficiaries must receive med-
ical services from only those providers selected by the state in the
contracting process.33 Beneficiary participation is no longer a matter
of choice as it was under the PHP program. 4
The Contracting Process
Under the new legislation, the Department of Health Services is
authorized to enter into contracts after either negotiation or competi-
tive bidding.35 The governor appointed a special negotiator to imple-
ment the contracting process.3 6 The negotiator was given maximum
29. The absence of litigation resulting in state liability indicates that state quality
control measures under the PHP program failed to place these state activities within the
purview of a state liability statute.
30. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14081 (West Supp. 1983). The purpose of the
legislation enabling contracts with select providers is:
to ensure that the Medi-Cal program shall be operated in the most cost-effective
and efficient manner possible . . . . In order to carry out the purpose it is the
specific intent of the Legislature that the special negotiator have maximum dis-
cretion and flexibility in order to select among various methods of arranging for
the provision of health services while achieving significant cost savings.
Id.
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 14082 (West Supp. 1983).
32. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14087 (West Supp. 1983) provides that benefi-
ciaries may receive medical services from noncontracting providers when (1) there is a
life-threatening or emergency situation, (2) the Medi-Cal patient is also Medicare eligi-
ble, or (3) the beneficiary resides an excessive distance from the nearest contracting
provider.
33. Certain hospitals are excepted from the contract process. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 14086 (West Supp. 1983). "The provisions of this article relating to contracts
with hospitals. . . shall not apply to hospital inpatient services rendered by health main-
tenance organizations and other organized health systems . . . or state hospitals." Id.
34. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14081 (West Supp. 1983). "This article shall be
the exclusive means of providing inpatient hospital services to recipients qualifying for
such care . . . ." Id.
35. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14082 (West Supp. 1983).
*36. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14082 (West Supp. 1983) provides the authority
flexibility in arranging contracts to achieve significant cost savings.3 7
The contracting process began with an invitation letter sent to
providers in a given area determined by, "population density, natural
boundaries, travel time, and customary health service delivery pat-
terns. ' ' 38 Hospitals choosing to participate submitted data showing
cost and facility utilization for the previous four years and made of-
fers for their services on an all-inclusive per diem rate.39
The negotiator was permitted to consider many factors including
price, accessibility, and quality of care in accepting offers.4 0 Hospital
offers were considered in relation to bed need estimates, services his-
torically rendered by hospitals in the area, and the historical cost of
those services.4 1 Each hospital's offer of contract terms and price was
also compared with the offers of other hospitals in the area.4 2 Conse-
quently, to enhance their competitive position, hospitals were en-
couraged to assume as mubh risk as possible.4 3 For example, hospi-
tals were expected to assume the risk of subcontracting for a needed
service they had not historically provided.4 4 Also, hospitals submit-
ting offers for a lesser charge, indicating willingness to assume more
risk of expenditures in excess of contract price, were viewed more
favorably in the contracting process.4 1 Medi-Cal provider contracts
were awarded to the most cost-effective and efficient hospitals, in
compliance with legislative intent.
Selective provider contracting as a cost containment device is
for the Governor to designate a special negotiator.
37, CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14081 (West Supp. 1983).
38. CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF SPECIAL HEALTH CARE NEGOTIATIONS, REPORT TO
THE LEGISLATURE ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE OFFICE OF SPECIAL HEALTH CARE NE-
GOTIATIONS 8 (May 1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT: HEALTH CARE NEGOTIATIONS].
39. Id. at 10-16.
40. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14083 (West Supp. 1983). Factors to be consid-
ered by the negotiator in arranging contracts include:
(a) Beneficiary access.
(b) Utilization controls.
(c) Demonstrated ability to provide or arrange needed specialized services.
(d) Ability to render quality services efficiently and economically.
(e) Protection against fraud and abuse.
(f) Any other factor which would reduce costs, promote access, or enhance the
quality of care.
(g) The capacity to provide a given tertiary service, such as specialized chil-
dren's services, on a regional basis.
(h) Recognition of the variation in severity of illness and complexity of care.
(i) Existing labor-management collective bargaining agreements.
41. REPORT: HEALTH CARE NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 38, at 16-17.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id. Even though quality of care is a factor to be considered in contracting with
providers, the primary purpose of the legislation is to limit Medi-Cal cost growth. Provid-
ers submitting offers for a lesser per diem charge were probably viewed more favorably
by the negotiator whose function was to obtain significant cost savings. See, e.g., supra
note 30.
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founded on the assumption that providers will furnish all medical
care necessitated by the patient's medical condition, absorbing cost
in excess of contract price.46 As a practical matter, hospitals, as
profit-making institutions,47 may be reluctant to accept loss. Con-
tracting will create the desired cost-saving incentive among provid-
ers. Because provider profit decreases in proportion to the amount of
medical care provided, limiting costs may result in limiting the quan-
tity and quality of medical services provided. Cost will likely become
a consideration in medical decision-making. Less costly medical ser-
vices are not always inadequate. The line between frugal medical
decisions and purely cost-conscious medical decisions, however, is a
fine one. Thus, selective provider contracting, by shifting cost risks to
the private sector, strains the quality of health care services fur-
nished by Medi-Cal providers.
The enabling legislation requires maintenance of the pre-con-
tracting quality of care. As previously noted, the state must formu-
late a Medicaid program which comports with federal regulations.
To adopt the contracting system, California was required to obtain a
waiver of Social Security Act provisions. 48 The waiver allows Cali-
fornia to restrict Medicaid beneficiaries' choice of provider to those
selected through the contracting process by the Department of
Health Services. 49 The waiver required state assurance that benefi-
ciaries would continue to receive high quality medical care under the
new program.50 Presently, federal officials of the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration are closely monitoring California's imple-
mentation of the new program to ensure compliance with the assur-
ances given in exchange for the waiver.
51
46. "Hospitals which negotiate at-risk contracts will have additional incentives to
improve efficiency and to assure all provided services are cost effective." FEDERAL
WAIVER REQUEST: CALIFORNIA'S SELECTIVE PROVIDER CONTRACTING PROGRAM 14
(1982). "The hospital is responsible for all costs of providing inpatient care and may look
only to the negotiated per diem rate for reimbursement." REPORT: HEALTH CARE NEGO-
TIATIONS, supra note 38, at 4.
47. The term profit-making institution is not used in its generic sense. The author
recognizes that most hospitals are non-profit organizations. This does not mean, however,
that hospitals can operate without showing a net cash inflow.
48. FEDERAL WAIVER REQUEST: CALIFORNIA'S SELECTIVE PROVIDER CON-
TRACTING PROGRAM (1982). Selective provider contracting did not meet federal require-
ments for state Medicaid plans because the state restricts beneficiary provider choice
under the plan. Therefore, the Department had to obtain a waiver of the federal regula-
tions which selective provider contracting violated.
49. Letter from Carolyne Davis to Governor Brown (Sept. 21, 1982) (granting the
Department of Health Services' waiver request).
50. Id.
51. Id. The waiver is for a two-year period, subject to renewal in October 1984
Quality Management Measures Under Selective Provider
Contracting
California's Department of Health Services has taken numerous
steps to control the quality of selected providers' services. First, the
contracts between the state and the providers require the providers
to furnish beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries equivalent medical ser-
vices. 52 Performance of this promise is an express condition prece-
dent to the state's obligation to pay.53 Providers also promise not to
discriminate against Medi-Cal beneficiaries in any manner, includ-
ing admission practices.54
Second, the Department of Health Services periodically reviews
provider performance to ensure compliance with contractual provi-
sions. 55 Reviews include on-site evaluations of the level and quality
of care furnished by the provider." Presently, these reviews are con-
ducted by the Licensing and Certification Division of the
Department. 7
Finally, the Department of Health Services has implemented an
incident report system as a state-wide quality of care monitoring de-
vice."" Anyone, including physicians in contracting or non-con-
tracting institutions, may report a perceived incident to the Depart-
provided that provider quality remains at the level prior to the contracting system.
52. REPORT: HEALTH CARE NEGOTiATiONS, supra note 38, app. J., at 10 (Model
Contract). The Model Contract for Hospital Inpatient Services provides:
As express conditions precedent to maturing the State's payment obligation
under the terms of this Contract ... the Provider shall:
(3) provide inpatient services in the same manner to beneficiaries as it provides
to all patients to whom it renders inpatient services.
(4) Not discriminate against Medi-Cal beneficiaries in any manner, including
admission practices, placement in special or separate wings or rooms, pro-
vision of special or separate meals, or waiting time for surgical procedures.
Each contract is negotiated individually and remains confidential. The Model Contract
provides an example of the contract sought to be arranged by the Office of Special
Health Care Negotiations of the Department of Health Services. Id. at 1.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14087.1 (West Supp. 1983). Reviews are con-
ducted pursuant to a statutory mandate which provides:
The department or its authorized agents shall conduct periodic audits or re-
views, including onsite reviews of performance under any contract made pursu-
ant to this article. These audits or reviews may evaluate the following:
(a) Level and quality of care, and the necessity and appropriateness of the
services provided.
(b) Internal procedures for assuring efficiency, economy and quality of care.
(c) Grievances relating to medical care and their disposition.
(d) Financial records only when determined necessary by the department to
protect public funds.
56. Telephone interview with Nancy Bookbinder, Office of Tom Elkin, Department
of Health Services (June 24, 1983).
57. Id.
58. Id.
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ment of Health Services. The Department then will conduct a
preliminary investigation. 9 If the incident raises a valid quality-of-
care issue, the matter is referred to the Licensing and Certification
Division. A team from the Division may then investigate the sus-
pect provider, questioning both hospital staff members and patients
and examining the provider's medical records."' The team reports its
findings to the Deputy Director of the Medi-Cal Operations Division
of the Department of Health Services. 2 If the provider is rendering
inadequate medical care, the Department may seek contractual rem-
edies against the provider, including termination of contract.6 3 The
Department may also take licensing action against the provider.6"
The state, recognizing the tension placed on health care quality by
provider contracting, seeks to avoid adverse impact on patients by
closely monitoring the activities of providers.65 As a practical matter,
the quality control measures will not counteract the cost-conscious-
ness created by selective provider contracting. Indeed, the rationale
of contracting is that by shifting cost risks to the private sector the
needed cost saving incentive will be created. 6 The state is not imple-
menting a true quality management system. The cost of a quality
management system sufficient to guard against poor practice would
likely eliminate any cost saving under the new program.6 7 Because
good medical practice is beyond the range of knowledge of most lay-
men, a quality management system would necessarily include fre-
quent on-site reviews and evaluations by physicians. Thus, state
quality control will not prevent poor practice by providers. As cost
consciousness increases, providers will be tempted to reduce access to
care. Providers will face the risk of medical malpractice since the





63. Telephone interview with Donna Hyatt, Legal Services Division, Department
of Health Services (June 29, 1983).
64. Id.
65. Telephone interview with Nancy Bookbinder, Office of Tom Elkin, Department
of Health Services (June 24, 1983). The Department will likely expand provider quality
supervision as contracting continues.
66. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
67. A quality control measure sufficient to prevent poor practice among providers
treating more than two million beneficiaries would require virtually constant provider
supervision by physicians. The cost of such a program would likely exceed the cost sav-
ings of provider contracting.
from financial restraints.68 Nevertheless, selective provider con-
tracting, by tying care to available financing, may afford providers a
defense to malpractice liability for injury resulting from their cost-
based care.
STANDARD OF CARE
Medical malpractice law defines the physician's duty of care by a
customary practice standard. The physician is under a duty to exer-
cise that degree of skill, knowledge and care that is ordinarily pos-
sessed and exercised by members of the medical profession under
similar. circumstances. 69 Under general negligence law, duty is de-
fined by independent judicial assessment of risk reasonableness. Mal-
practice law does not incorporate such an assessment when defining
the duty owed.70 Rather, the standard of care is usually established
by expert testimony as the conduct of similarly situated physicians in
good standing.71 A physician, however, is not held to a single course
of conduct. When a "respectable" minority of physicians support a
certain course of conduct, a physician may act accordingly without
breaching a duty to the patient.
7 2
Historically, the standard of care was defined by the locality doc-
trine.1 3 A physician was held to the standard of customary practice
of similarly situated physicians in the same locality.74 The doctrine
emerged because physicians practicing in rural areas had relatively
limited access to medical resources.75 The locality rule gradually dis-
appeared as communication systems improved and medical resources
68. The physician is held to the standard of customary practice of similarly situ-
ated physicians in good standing. Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976). To date, a physician's financial situation has not been incorporated
into the standard to which a physician is held. This may be due, in part, to the fact that,
in the past, physicians have not had to render treatment to patients without the opportu-
nity for reimbursement.
69. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 408, 551 P.2d 389, 392-93, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 69, 72-73 (1976).
70. See Meier v. Ross Gen. Hospr., 69 Cal. 2d 420, 455 P.2d 519, 71 Cal. Rptr.
903 (1968) (usually, a physician's breach of duty can be shown only by expert testi-
mony). See also Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Cus-
tomary Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1377. The customary standard fails to define the
optimum level of risk permissible and therefore needlessly encourages defensive
medicine-an impediment to cost efficiency.
71. Lawless v. Calaway, 24 Cal. 2d 81, 86, 147 P.2d 604, 609 (1944). See also
Blumstein, Rationing Medical Resources: A Constitutional, Legal and Policy Analysis,
59 TEX. L. REv. 1345, 1395 (1981).
72. Bruce v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 579 (S.D. Cal. 1958).
73. Comment, Medical Malpractice: The Locality Rule in Relation to BAJI 6.00
and Sinz v. Owen, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 163 (1972) (concludes that the malpractice standard
no longer incorporates the locality doctrine).
74. Engelking v. Carlson, 13 Cal. 2d 216, 88 P.2d 695 (1939).
75. Comment, supra note 73 at 771.
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became more readily available to the rural physician. 6
Hospitals may also be liable to patients. Hospital liability can be
separated into three categories. First, a hospital may be vicariously
liable for the negligence of employees.77 Second, a hospital may be
liable for the negligence of independent contractor physicians if it
acted negligently in selecting and reviewing these persons.78 Finally,
a hospital may be liable for its own independent negligent conduct.79
Provider contracting, to the extent that it affects the physician's duty
to beneficiaries, may have implications for hospital liability under
either the doctrine of respondeat superior or the doctrine of corpo-
rate negligence.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, hospitals are vicari-
ously liable for the negligent acts of employees and others over
whom the hospital has a significant degree of control.80 Under these
circumstances, the hospital is liable only if the employee could be
held liable.81 Consequently, if the employee can show no breach of
duty, the hospital will not be liable. Where the hospital employee is
a physician, any change in the customary practice standard will be
determinative of hospital liability under the doctrine of respondeat
superior.
Similarly, any change in the customary practice standard will af-
fect hospital liability under the doctrine of corporate negligence.
Under this doctrine, a hospital owes patients the duty to carefully
select and review physicians with whom the hospital contracts.
82
Conceivably, a hospital could be negligent in review and selection
even if the independent contractor physician had not acted negli-
gently. However, liability requires a showing of causation and dam-
ages as well as negligence. 3 If the physician were not negligent, then
76. Id.
77. Bowers v. Olch, 120 Cal. App. 2d 108, 260 P.2d 997 (1953).
78. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982),
modified, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982).
79. Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Medical Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d
193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967) (hospital failed to render sufficient care, resulting in a
mental patient jumping from a hospital window).
80. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955) (anesthesiologist was
"on call" at the hospital); see also Hanson & Strimberg, Hospital Liability for Negli-
gence, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 7 (1969).
81. Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 291 P.2d 915 (1955).
82. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982),
modified, 133 Cal. App. 3d 94a, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982). See also Comment, Piercing
the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 383 (1980).
83. United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 463 P.2d
770, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1970) (actionable negligence requires a legal duty to use due
there could be no causation or damages. Consequently, the hospital
would not be liable to a plaintiff-patient even if it could be shown
that it acted negligently in its selection and review. Because of the
apparent difficulty in finding hospital liability in the absence of inde-
pendent contractor negligence, hospital liability under the corporate
negligence doctrine seems to be dependent on a prior showing of in-
dependent contractor negligence. If an independent contractor physi-
cian can show he acted as similarly situated physicians in good
standing would have acted, he Will not be negligent and, conse-
quently, not liable.8 4 If the physician is not liable, then the hospital
will not be liable since causation and damages could not be shown.
Therefore, a change in the physician's standard of care is determina-
tive of hospital liability under the corporate negligence doctrine.
Situations of hospital liability based on either respondeat superior
or corporate negligence must be distinguished from situations where
the hospital is liable for its own independent negligence. Hospitals
are under a duty to exercise such reasonable care toward a patient as
his mental and physical condition requires and to exercise ordinary
care to provide suitable supplies, equipment and facilities.8 5 Essen-
tially, a hospital may be liable for failing to act reasonably towards
the patient. Under such circumstances, hospital liability is not de-
pendent upon employee or independent contractor liability. 6 There-
fore, change in physician's standard of care would not affect hospital
liability for independent acts of negligence. In these circumstances,
provider contracting will leave hospitals in a predicament. In the
event that costs of necessary medical services, supplies and equip-
ment exceed the contract payment price, the hospital will be forced
to absorb excess cost or risk liability.
Thus, any change in the physician's legal standard of care affects
both physician and hospital liability. The malpractice standard of
care changes as customary medical practice changes. Selective pro-
vider contracting encourages cost consciousness in medical decision-
making. Providers, laden with cost-saving incentives, will be charged
with the medical care of some two to three million beneficiaries.
87 If
a "respectable minority" 88 of the medical profession considers cost in
medical decision-making, then cost-based medical decisions may be-
come part of an accepted practice standard. Such a change would
result in a standard of care reminiscent of the locality doctrine,
care, a breach of that duty, and that the breach be the proximate cause of the injury).
84. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
86. Id.
87. PHP REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. In 1982, 2.9 million persons qualified as
Medi-Cal eligible.
88. See Bovbjerg, supra note 70, at 1385.
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where money rather than medical resources is determinative of the
physician's standard of care. Customary practice among contracting
providers would be unique, resulting in a separate Medi-Cal practice
standard. Such a standard would enhance cost containment objec-
tives. Physicians, basing medical decisions on cost, would be shielded
from malpractice liability for injury resulting from cost-based deci-
sions. Without the threat of malpractice liability, physicians would
tend to develop innovative cost-saving methods. 89
The Professional Standards Review Organization's (PSRO) norm
is an example of a practice standard which incorporates a considera-
tion of cost. PSROs were established by Congress to review claims
for Medicare and Medicaid payment °0 Claim reviews include a de-
termination of whether provider health service quality conforms to
recognized standards. 91 PSRO quality decisions furnish a practice
standard on which a provider can rely when treating beneficiaries.
2
Providers are immune from liability when conforming to PSRO
norms. 93 The PSRO immunity statute was intended as a cost con-
tainment measure.9 4 By shielding conforming providers from mal-
practice liability, the PSRO legislation "eliminates the need for un-
necessary medical treatment as a precaution against malpractice
liability."
9 5
Nevertheless, a special Medi-Cal practice standard would be fun-
damentally inconsistent with tort law principles. Malpractice law as-
pires to the twin goals of victim compensation and quality assur-
ance.98 The duty owed should be defined accordingly. Reliance on
customary medical practices to set the standard of care under mal-
practice law is justified for two reasons. First, medical decisions are
typically beyond the competency of laymen. 7 Judges and juries are
usually unable to assess risk appropriateness. Second, the aggregate
of professional medical judgment best sets the socially appropriate
level of risk.98 The concept of medical professionalism, which makes
89. Id. at 1386.
90. Note, Federally Imposed Self Regulation of Medical Practice: A Critique of
the Professional Standards Review Organization, 42 GEo. VASH. L. REV. 822, 824
(1975).
91. Id.
92. Blumstein, supra note 71, 'at 1397.
93. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-16(c) (1976)).
94. Blumstein, supra note 71, at 1397.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1395.
97. Bovbjerg, supra note 70, at 1392.
98. Id. at 1393.
the customary practice standard appropriate, is devoted to the pa-
tient's best interests.9 9 Thus, malpractice law emphasizes quality of
care. Cost containment objectives emphasize reduced quantity of
care which may result in reducing the quality of care.
For this reason, malpractice law and cost containment objectives
are inconsistent. Cost-based medical treatment is an objective for-
eign to the concept of medical professionalism underlying the cus-
tomary standard of care. A Medi-Cal practice standard, incorpo-
rated into the legal standard, would subvert malpractice law
objectives by denying Medi-Cal recipients compensation for injury
resulting from medical care where quality is defined in terms of cost-
saving objectives. The general quality of care for all Medi-Cal recip-
ients would be decreased. Permitting lower standards of care for
Medi-Cal than for non-Medi-Cal patients would deny Medi-Cal pa-
tients the potential for recovery available to non-Medi-Cal patients.
As such, beneficiaries could be denied equal protection of the law.100
A special Medi-Cal practice standard would also result in a con-
flict between the provider's contractual obligation to the state and its
tort duty to the patient. Under Medi-Cal contracts, providers ex-
pressly promise to furnish beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
equivalent quality health care. 10 1 The state may pursue contract
remedies if a provider fails to comply with this covenant. 10 2 Coinci-
dentally, the beneficiary may be denied a tort remedy because of the
Medi-Cal practice standard. A contract obligation is not dispositive
of a tort duty. Nevertheless, a contracting provider should not be
able to shield itself from tort liability while simultaneously deviating
from prior quality of care assurances.
Thus, change in the customary practice of Medi-Cal providers
should not affect the physician's duty to the Medi-Cal patient.
Under the new Medi-Cal program, the customary practice standard
may afford providers a shield to malpractice liability, undermining
the goals of malpractice law. The customary practice standard
should be applied only to the extent that it permits quality assur-
ance. Without such limitation the physician's standard of care fails
its essential purpose of defining a socially appropriate level of risk.
The effect of Medi-Cal provider contracting on the malpractice
standard of care becomes an issue of increased significance when
99. Schuck, Malpractice Liability and the Rationing of Care, 59 TEx. L. REv.
1421, 1422 (1981).
100. A discussion of the constitutional law issues resulting from differing standards
of care owed to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is beyond the scope of this Comment.
For a discussion of constitutional issues raised by rationed health care, see Blumstein,
supra note 71, at 1356-92.
101. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
102. Telephone interview with Donna Hyatt, Legal Services Division, Department
of Health Services (June 29, 1983).
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considering recent moves toward a completely competitive health
care system. Recent California legislation indicates such a move.
Along with the selective provider contracting legislation, another bill
passed enabling the private sector-insurance companies-to con-
tract with hospitals for medical services.21s In a competitive system,
cost would very likely become a primary cwncern for most of the
medical community. Practice standards Would change. Consequently,
the customary practice standard of care would change, shielding
physicians from liability for cost-based medical decisions. The mal-
practice standard of care, to meet its goals, cannot continue to be
defined in terms of customary practice in a competitive health care
system. Rather, the malpractice standard of care must continue to
incorporate as its primary objective a consideration of the patient's
best interests.
STATE LIABILITY UNDER SELECTIVE PROVIDER CONTRACTING
In addition to its potential effect on physician and hospital liabil-
ity, selective provider contracting has implications for state liability.
Increased state involvement in the disbursement of services under
Medi-Cal makes the state particularly susceptible to liability under
the Tort Claims Act, California's statute limiting sovereign immu-
nity.204 The Act sets forth two sources of liability upon which a
plaintiff-beneficiary might base an action against the state.
Torts of an Independent Contractor
California law permits public entity liability for injury caused by
the tort of an independent contractor. The liability is generally the
same as that of a private person, with the limitation that the state
will only be liable to the extent it would be liable if the independent
contractor were a state employee.1 0 5 The exception seems to make
103. CAL. INS. CODE § 10133 (West Supp. 1983).
104. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996.6 (West 1980). The Tort Claims Act is a com-
prehensive set of government liability statutes. The legislation eliminates common law
liabilities of the state. The state may be liable only as provided by statute.
105. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.4 (West 1980) provides:
A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by a tortious act or omis-
sion of an independent contractor of the public entity to the same extent that
the public entity would be subject to such liability if it were a private person.
Nothing in this section subjects a public entity to liability for the act or omission
of an independent contractor if the public entity would not have been liable for
the injury had the act or omission been that of an employee of the public entity.
In Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal. 2d 245, 253, 437 P.2d 508, 513, 66 Cal. Rptr. 20,
25 (1968), the court noted:
applicable those statutory immunity provisions relating to state lia-
bility for employee torts. Thus, the state may be liable for injury
caused by the malpractice of a provider if a private person in the
state's position would be liable and no statutory immunities apply.106
A private person, meaning an individual or corporation, 107 would
be subject to liability for injury caused by the tort of an independent
contractor. Hospitals often contract with physicians to furnish medi-
cal services to hospital patients. As previously discussed, hospitals
may be liable to patients for the torts of independent contractor phy-
sicians.110 Two duties, owed directly to the patient by the hospital,
are recognized under the corporate negligence doctrine. First, hospi-
tals owe patients the duty to use reasonable care to select competent
physicians. 109 Second, hospitals owe patients the duty to use reasona-
ble care to review the practice of the contracting physician once
hired.110 A California court, in Elam v. College Park, gave judicial
recognition to the corporate negligence principle, holding that a hos-
pital has the duty to carefully select independent contractor physi-
cians and to evaluate the quality of medical treatment rendered by
these persons. 1 The court reasoned that since hospitals undertake to
provide medical care, the patient can expect that the hospital will be
responsible for physicians with whom it contracts.""' Additionally,
the court noted that imposition of such duty would have a "prophy-
lactic" effect, encouraging hospitals to assure the competence of
their medical staffs by careful selection and review.11 3 Thus, hospi-
tals are liable for the torts of independent contractors if the duties of
careful selection and review have been breached. If a hospital were
to contract with providers to furnish Medi-Cal services, the hospital
would owe beneficiaries the duty to carefully select and review prov-
iders. If the hospital failed to use reasonable care to discharge these
duties, it would be liable for the provider's tort. Therefore, the state,
It is clear that the liability of an employer of an independent contractor for the
latter's tortious conduct is broad, and it must be assumed that the Legislature
was aware of the extent of liability when, by adopting section 815.4 of the Gov-
ernment Code, it chose with one exception. . . to waive the defense of sovereign
immunity in cases involving tortious conduct of independent contractors.
106. The Model Contract identifies the state-provider relationship as follows: "The
State and Provider hereby acknowledge that they are independent contractors to one
another and neither is an officer, agent, or employee of the other for any purposes."
REPORT: HEALTH CARE NEGOTIATIONS, supra note 38, app. J at 31 (Model Contract).
107. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 17 (West 1980) provides: "'Person' includes any person,
firm, association, organization, partnership, business trust, corporation, or company."
108. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
109. Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 345, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156,




113. Id. at 346, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
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having potential liability for independent contractor torts to the same
extent as a private person in the state's position, owes beneficiaries
similar duties of selection and review under the state independent
contractor statute. Consequently, the breach of such duties would
expose the state to liability for provider torts.
State Medi-Cal contracting is sufficiently similar to hospital physi-
cian contracting so as to warrant imposition of liability under corpo-
rate negligence principles as disclosed in Elam. The state is control-
ling the medical care that beneficiaries receive under the Medi-Cal
program through its selection and qualification of hospitals as Medi-
Cal providers. As previously discussed,114 beneficiaries are directed
to seek out contracting providers for medical needs. Essentially, the
state is making a quality choice for the beneficiary. The state is im-
pliedly telling the beneficiary that adequate care can be received at
the mandated hospital. The beneficiary then can expect that the
state will carefully select and review these providers to ensure their
medical competence. Therefore, the state owes beneficiaries the duty
to carefully select and supervise the providers it has chosen for the
beneficiary.115 Recognition of this duty would encourage the state to
assure the competence of providers by careful selection and review.
If the provider were an employee of the state, the state would still
be liable. The statute makes governmental immunity provisions a
valid defense to state liability.116 The state is immune from liability
for injury resulting from an exercise of official discretion vested in
public employees.1 17 "Operational" level torts, such as ordinary med-
ical malpractice in diagnosis and treatment of patients, are not ex-
cepted from state liability.1 " Therefore, plaintiff beneficiaries' recov-
114. See supra note 34.
115. Duty is an expression of public policy entitling a particular plaintiff to protec-
tion. Duty is measured by the foresecability of risk resulting from negligent conduct.
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Medi-Cal con-
tracting, by limiting beneficiary health care to providers selected on the basis of cost
efficiency, creates the risk of injury resulting from purely cost-based medical decisions.
State duties of careful provider selection and review would provide beneficiary protection
from such risk.
116. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.4 (West 1980). See supra note 105.
117. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 820.2 (West 1980).
118. Bohrer v. County of San Diego, 104 Cal. App. 3d 155, 160, 163 Cal. Rptr.
419, 423 (1980). A hospital employee negligently administered drugs to the patient after
notice of the patient's drug abuse, causing the patient to commit suicide. The court re-
jected defendant's assertion of discretionary immunity, reasoning that discretionary im-
munity applied to basic policy decisions. Here, the negligent employee's decision was not
a policy-making decision that warranted application of blanket governmental immunity.
See also Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1977); United States v. Canon, 217
F.2d 70 (9th Cir. 1954) (both cases admitting liability for operational torts such as ordi-
ery from the state for injury resulting from provider negligence in
diagnosis and treatment is possible under the state independent con-
tractor statute, since it is not precluded by state employee immunity
provisions.
Failure to Discharge a Mandatory Duty
An alternative to state liability for failure to carefully review pro-
viders is the mandatory duty theory. California law recognizes public
entity liability for injury resulting from failure to use reasonable dili-
gence to discharge a mandatory duty that is designed to protect
against the injury which occurred.11" 9 A mandatory quality manage-
ment provision is included among the selective provider contracting
statutes. 120 The statute requires the Department of Health Services
to review and evaluate, among other things, the quality of care
among providers.1 21 Arguably, the statute was enacted to protect
beneficiaries from injury resulting from provider malpractice.
122
Therefore, failure of the state to exercise reasonable diligence' 23 to
ensure beneficiaries quality health care may result in a presumption
of negligence. State liability would then result if proximate cause
can be shown.
nary malpractice in diagnosis and treatment under the Federal Tort Claims Act which
also provides discretionary immunity).
119. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815.6 (West 1980) provides:
Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that
is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public
entity is liable for an injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to
discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasona-
ble diligence to discharge the duty.
120. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14087.1 (West Supp. 1983). See also supra
note 55 and accompanying text.
121. Id.
122. Id. See also supra note 55. The Legislative Council Digest does not indicate
the intention of the Legislature in enacting the review provision. However, the first of the
review subjects mentioned is quality of care. Additionally, the Department of Health
Services, in the Federal Waiver Request, warranted that "utilization and quality assur-
ance systems already in place in the California Medi-Cal program and already approved
in our existing State Plan will be maintained in order to assure that quality care is pro-
vided to all beneficiaries . . . . In addition periodic hospital reviews will be continued."
FEDERAL WAIVER REQUEST: CALIFORNIA'S SELECTIVE PROVIDER CONTRACTING PRO-
GRAM 16 (1982). Therefore, since the review statute contains quality of care as the first-
mentioned review subject and the Department of Health Services, in the Federal Waiver
Request, warrants health quality control, it seems that statute was enacted to protect
beneficiaries from injury resulting from poor provider practice.
123. Reasonable diligence depends on the particular facts and circumstances of a
case as determined by the jury. Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, 12 Cal. 3d 710, 527
P.2d 865, 117 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1974) (trial court decision, nonsuiting plaintiff on grounds
of governmental immunity, was reversed and remanded for determination of reasonable
diligence); Morris v. Marin County, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 559 P.2d 606, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251
(1977) (where decision granting defendant's demurrer on grounds of governmental im-
munity was reversed and the issue of reasonable diligence left to the trier of fact).
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State Immunities
California's Tort Claims Act is structured such that any applica-
ble statutory immunity will defeat a claim based on a statute provid-
ing liability.124 In an action by a plaintiff-patient, the state may as-
sert immunity through several immunity statutes. These statutes
may, in varying degrees, interpose barriers to state liability based on
either the independent contractor or mandatory duty statute. How-
ever, present state activity in Medi-Cal fails to invoke any of the
immunity statutes.
The state is immune from liability for injury caused by the failure
of a public entity or employee to make a physical examination to
determine whether a particular person has a medical condition haz-
ardous to himself or others.125 Because the independent contractor
liability statute makes applicable immunity provisions applying to
public employees in the contractor's position, the state might assert
immunity for injury resulting from a contractor's inadequate diagno-
sis of a beneficiary's health condition. However, the immunity provi-
sion is not intended to apply to negligent examination of patients for
purposes of treatment. 26 Rather, the provision applies to the negli-
124. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 815(b) (West 1980) provides:
The liability of a public entity established by this part (commencing with sec-
tion 814) is subject to any immunity of the public entity provided by statute,
including this part, and is subject to any defenses that would be available to the
public entity if it were a private person.
See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 815.2(b), 820(b) (West 1980).
125. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 855.6 (West 1980) provides:
Except for an examination or diagnosis for the purpose of treatment, neither a
public entity nor a public employee acting within the scope of his employment is
liable for injury caused by the failure to make a physical or mental examination,
or to make an adequate physical or mental examination, of any person for the
purpose of determining whether such person has a disease or physical or mental
condition that would constitute a hazard to the health or safety of himself or
others.
(Emphasis added).
126. Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity, 4 CALIFORNIA L. REVI-
SION COMM'N REP. 801, 831 (1963):
Public entities and public health officials and other public employees who are
required to examine persons to determine their physical condition should not be
liable for failing to examine or to make an adequate examination of any person
for the purpose of determining whether such person has a communicable disease
or any other condition that might constitute a hazard to the public or to the
person examined. This immunity from liability would not cover an examination
or diagnosis for the purpose of treatment, but would cover such examinations as
public tuberculosis examinations, examinations for the purpose of determining
whether persons should be isolated or quarantined, eye examinations for pro-
spective drivers, and examinations of athletes--such as boxers or high school
football players-to determine whether they are qualified to engage in athletic
gent failure to discover a public health hazard. 127 Therefore, the im-
munity would apply only to situations where the provider inade-
quately diagnosed a beneficiary, resulting in a danger to public
health at large as opposed to danger to the individual himself. The
statute seems to contemplate an action by a member of the public
who contracted a communicable disease rather than an action by a
beneficiary for the negligence of a provider in treating an individual
health problem.
A second statute which seems applicable provides for governmen-
tal immunity from liability for injury caused by adopting or failing
to adopt an enactment or by failing to enforce any law. 128 The stat-
ute applies to the discretionary acts of lawmakers and law enforc-
ers .1 2 The state may argue immunity from liability for the injurious
repercussions of the Medi-Cal legislation. However, action upon ei-
ther the independent contractor or mandatory duty statute is not
based on the policy decision of the legislature to implement a new
Medi-Cal payment system. Rather, it is based, in the instant situa-
tion, on the Department of Health Services' failure to discharge its
duty to supervise Medi-Cal contractors. More specifically, the immu-
nity statute does not preclude an action based on the failure to dis-
charge a mandatory duty statute.130 The legislature drafted a statute
activity.
127. Id.
128. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.2 (West 1980) provides: "A public entity is not lia-
ble for an injury caused by adopting or by failing to adopt an enactment or by failing to
enforce any law."
129. Law Revision Commission Comment:
This section would be unnecessary except for a possible implication that might
arise from section 815.6 which imposes liability upon public entities for failure
to exercise reasonable diligence to comply with a mandatory duty imposed by an
enactment. This section recognizes that the wisdom of legislative or quasi-legis-
lative action, and the discretion of law enforcement officers in carrying out their
duties, should not be subject to review in tort suits for damages if political re-
sponsibility for these decisions is to be retained.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.2 Law Revision Commission Comment (West 1980).
130. See, e.g., Elton v. County of Orange, 3 Cal. App. 3d 1053, 84 Cal. Rptr. 27
(1970). The Orange County Probation Department placed a dependent child with foster
parents who physically abused the child. The State Department of Social Welfare had
certified the foster home. The plaintiff child sued the state on two grounds: that the
County was negligent in placing the child in the foster home, and that the County had
failed to enforce Social Welfare Department regulations, requiring the County to inspect,
supervise, and control child placement in foster homes. On the issue of County negli-
gence, the County asserted governmental immunity under California Government Code
section 820.2, providing that, "a public employee is not liable for an injury resulting from
his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of an exercise of discretion
vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 820.2
(West 1980). The court held that while the decision to classify the child as dependent
was a basic policy decision, the subsequent ministerial act of placing the child in 'the
home fell outside the purview of section 820.2. On the issue of failure to discharge a
mandatory duty, the County asserted immunity under California Government Code §
818.2 (West 1980) (see supra note 128) and California Government Code § 818.6 (West
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requiring the Department of Health Services to review providers. 131
Consequently, deciding whether or not to review the contractor is not
a decision which falls within the purview of the Department's discre-
tion. Therefore, this discretionary immunity statute does not pre-
clude plaintiff beneficiary recovery on either the mandatory duty or
independent contractor statute.
Finally, Government Code section 818.4 provides governmental
immunity from liability for injury resulting from licensing and certi-
fication decisions.32 The state may argue that provider qualification
for Medi-Cal involvement is an activity covered by the statute. How-
ever, provider qualification, under selective provider contracting,
goes beyond the normal licensing and certification activities con-
ducted by the Licensing and Certification Division of the Depart-
ment of Health Services. Under the present Medi-Cal plan, the state
qualifies certain licensed and certified hospitals as Medi-Cal provid-
ers. The state is not approving the medical institutions held open to
the public. Rather, it is selecting certain already licensed medical
providers as appropriate for Medi-Cal participation based on their
ability to render medical services in a cost-efficient fashion.
CONCLUSION
Selective provider contracting emerged as the legislature's answer
to escalating Medi-Cal costs. By creating cost-saving incentives, the
system encourages providers to alter their standard of practice to one
which is cost conscious. Therefore, the customary practice standard
could conceivably change to include recognition of costs as a factor
in medical decision-making. However, such a standard would subvert
malpractice law objectives by failing to permit quality assurance and
victim compensation. Regardless of cost-saving goals, providers
should continue to provide beneficiaries quality health care. A stan-
1980) (providing for government immunity for negligent inspection of property). The
court rejected the County on both grounds, holding that section 818.2 did not preclude
liability for failure to discharge a mandatory duty. The court also noted that the action
was not precluded by section 818.6 because the action was based on failure to discharge
the duty to supervise and not improper certification.
131. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 14087.1 (West Supp. 1983). See supra note 55.
132. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 818.4 (West 1980) provides:
A public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the issuance, denial, suspen-
sion or revocation of or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or re-
voke, any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization
where the public entity or an employer of the public entity is authorized by
enactment to determine whether or not such authorization should be issued, de-
nied, suspended or revoked.
dard of care divorced from cost considerations would aid in striking
a balance between cost saving and health care quality. Providers
would render quality care or face the risk of malpractice liability.
Similarly, recognition of a state duty to supervise provider quality
would force the state to ensure provider quality or face the risk of
liability. State tort liability resulting in financial loss would be an
ironic result of a plan directed at cost containment. Nevertheless,
tort law, in defining the duty owed, should recognize the importance
of protecting individuals from harm as opposed to protecting the
state or providers from financial loss.
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